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Abstract
There is growing interest in technology-enabled con-
tact tracing, the process of identifying potentially in-
fected COVID-19 patients by notifying all recent con-
tacts of an infected person. Governments, technology
companies, and research groups alike recognize the
potential for smartphones, IoT devices, and wearable
technology to automatically track “close contacts”
and identify prior contacts in the event of an indi-
vidual’s positive test. However, there is currently
significant public discussion about the tensions be-
tween effective technology-based contact tracing and
the privacy of individuals. To inform this discussion,
we present the results of a sequence of online surveys
focused on contact tracing and privacy, each with 100
participants. Our first surveys were on April 1 and
3, and we report primarily on those first two surveys,
though we present initial findings from later survey
dates as well. Our results present the diversity of
public opinion and can inform the public discussion
on whether and how to leverage technology to re-
duce the spread of COVID-19. We are continuing to
conduct longitudinal measurements, and will update
this report over time; citations to this version of the
report should reference Report Version 1.0, May 8,
2020.
1 Introduction
Technology companies, university research groups,
and governments are rapidly working to develop and
deploy contact tracing apps to track and mitigate
the spread of COVID-19. Prior work has determined
that contact tracing apps will be most effective when
used by the majority of a population [35, 36]; how-
ever, some have raised security and privacy concerns
(e.g., [33, 64]) as well as broader concerns about effi-
cacy (e.g., [63]).
Our research seeks to provide the scientific, tech-
nology, and policy communities with a better in-
formed understanding of the public’s privacy values,
concerns, and opinions around the use of proposed
automated contact tracing technologies. We argue
neither for nor against automated contact tracing in
this work, but instead offer a summary of public opin-
ion on potential contact tracing scenarios, as we ob-
serve that many regions are moving towards auto-
mated contact tracing programs. We ask the follow-
ing research questions:
• Data sources. What data sources do people
feel most and least comfortable with being used
for contact tracing? We ask about multiple data
sources, including: cell tower data, data from an
existing app, data from a new app by a known
entity or company, proximity data, credit card
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history, and surveillance camera footage.1
• Data sharing and usage What are people’s
opinions regarding contact tracing data being
shared with or used by different entities for the
purposes of contact tracing? We ask about data
sharing with and usage by multiple entities, in-
cluding: their government, cellular provider or
cellphone manufacturer, and various well-known
technology companies.
• Other privacy concerns and mitigations.
What other privacy concerns do people have
when deciding whether to download a contact
tracing app? In what circumstances are people
most likely to download and use a contact trac-
ing app?
We capture public opinion through online surveys
using an international paid survey platform (Prolific).
Our first two surveys were on April 1 and 3, 2020,
and we are continuing to repeat variants of this on-
line survey at regular intervals. Each survey is with
100 participants. Our April 1 and 3 surveys were
from before the virus had reached its peak infection
rate, before contact tracing apps were ubiquitously
available in many countries, and early in the public
discourse about contact tracing. This version of our
paper focuses on the April 1 and 3 survey results,
though we do also discuss initial findings from later
surveys as well.
We are releasing our results now, although prelim-
inary, so that they can inform (1) ongoing technical
efforts to design contact tracing apps in a privacy-
preserving manner, (2) how the makers of such a con-
tact tracing app or program communicate the privacy
properties of their contact tracing program to their
potential users, and (3) legal and policy discussions
around the appropriate use of such technologies.
To sample some preliminary findings:
1. From April 1 and 3, 2020 (week 1): if a contact
tracing app “protected [their] data perfectly”,
1We added in the questions about proximity data, credit
card history, and surveillance camera footage questions after
our initial survey. These questions do not appear in our first
two weeks of survey data, which focus on location data.
72% of participants said they would be at least
somewhat likely to download it; as privacy risks
increase, their self-reported download likelihood
decreases (Section 6.4).
2. From April 1 and 3, 2020 (week 1): partici-
pants preferred a company that they already
trust with respect to security and privacy and
that they perceive to have the resources and do-
main knowledge to add location tracking and
analysis. To some, it is important that location
tracking is already the primary purpose of the
app, if added to an existing app. Many expressed
a more positive view of specific companies (e.g.,
Google) or apps (e.g., Google Maps), even be-
fore Google and Apple announced their efforts
(Sections 6.3, 6.5).
3. From April 1 and 3, 2020 (week 1): support for
government use of location data (for the pur-
poses of studying or mitigating COVID-19) var-
ied by situation, but was never strongly sup-
ported. Participants were more comfortable
than not with their government analyzing their
cell tower location data if they tested positive for
COVID-19, but also expressed a strong lack of
confidence that their government would use the
data only for COVID-19 mitigation; over half
were concerned that data sharing with their gov-
ernment would bring harm to themselves or their
community (Sections 6.2, 6.5, 6.6).
4. From April 17, 23, and May 1 (weeks 3-5): par-
ticipants may not view proximity tracking as
more privacy-respecting than location tracking.
Participants reported, through separate ques-
tions about location tracking apps and proxim-
ity tracking apps, they would be no more likely
to download a proximity tracking app than they
would a location tracking app in which the app
makers knew their location. They indicated con-
cerns about the security and privacy of prox-
imity tracking that may not be consistent with
the proximity tracking developers’ threat mod-
els. We encourage contact tracing and prox-
imity tracking developers to consider how to
best communicate the threat model that their
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protocol defends against to non-technical users,
and whether that threat model matches up with
what their users actually want and need (Sec-
tion 6.8).
Stepping back, we stress that this report primarily
documents findings from our April 1 and 3, 2020 sur-
veys, though we do discuss some results from later
survey dates. Public sentiment may change over
time, as the number of infected people changes, as
new technologies emerge, as new policies are pro-
posed or enacted, and as new public discussions en-
sue. A future version of this paper will report on
our longitudinal measurements. Additionally, we
stress that our study focuses on the interplay between
privacy and contact tracing, and does not consider
the numerous other user-centered challenges around
automated contact tracing, such as algorithmic ac-
countability or differences in the availability and us-
ability of smartphones or apps across populations.
We surface these questions further in Section 3.3 and
urge other researchers, app developers, technology
companies, and governments to consider these issues
as they consider developing and deploying automated
contact tracing programs.
2 Limitations
We are presenting these preliminary results without
peer review because we believe our results have the
potential to inform the current rapidly-evolving tech-
nical work on contact tracing apps. However, because
the paper has yet to undergo peer review, and despite
our good faith attempts never to mislead or misrep-
resent our findings, we hope the reader will be espe-
cially cautious in interpreting our results.
We also stress that these results are preliminary :
we present the raw percentages of participants who
answered each multiple choice question, along with N,
the number of participants who answered that ques-
tion (sample size). We have not done statistical anal-
ysis of variance within questions or correlation across
questions or participant groups. We will update this
paper with additional analyses, including our analy-
sis of longitudinal data and statistical analyses, over
time.
Country Total pop 4/1 cases 5/1 cases
UK 65.8m 29.9k 178.7k
USA 332.6m 213.2k 1.1m
Europe 741.m 429k 1.4m
Table 1: State of the world on April 1. European
countries represented in our survey on April 1 + 3
are: Portugal (≤15% of participants); Poland (≤10%
of participants); Greece, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands,
Spain, Hungary, New Zealand, Germany, Finland,
Israel, Estonia, Denmark, Slovenia, Turkey, Latvia,
Belgium, and France (≤5% of participants). Other
countries represented in our survey on April 1 + 3
are: Canada, Mexico, Israel, Chile, Australia (≤5%
of participants) [1, 2, 3].
Finally, online surveys such as ours have inherent
limitations. Participants may experience survey fa-
tigue and click through long matrix questions, giving
inaccurate answers in order to finish the survey more
quickly. From initial qualitative analysis, responses
to free response questions seem to be on topic and
high quality, indicating a low rate of survey fatigue.
Survey fatigue, or any lack thereof, may also be af-
fected by the fact that participants were payed, and
therefore incentivized to finish.
Prior work on Mechanical Turk participants in the
United States — a different survey platform than
the one we used — has found, with varied results,
that online survey participants may not be represen-
tative of the general population [58]. Other studies
have examined whether online survey participants’
security and privacy knowledge and behavior accu-
rately represent the general public, with varying re-
sults [46, 57].
3 Location tracking during the
COVID-19 pandemic
Because the pace of development on contact tracing
apps is so rapid, and because the pandemic situation
is rapidly evolving around the world, we expect this
section to be quickly outdated. However, it is im-
portant to capture the state of the world on April 1,
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when we first deployed our survey (and the results of
which we report on here), and how contact tracing ef-
forts have grown since then, in order to contextualize
our results.
3.1 State of the world as of April 1
On April 1, the course of the COVID-19 pandemic
had not yet peaked outside Asia. Table 1 shows the
number of infections on April 1 and May 1 in the
top three broad regions in our survey, the UK, US,
and Europe (minus the UK), representing 88.5% of
survey participants. As of this writing, many Eu-
ropean countries—e.g., Spain, Italy, and Germany—
have seen slowing or slightly declining rates of infec-
tion [4].
On April 1, many European countries, including
the UK, Germany, Italy, and Spain, were under vary-
ing forms of lock down, with some combination of
schools, restaurants, bars, and non-essential shops
closed, public gatherings banned, and citizens urged
or mandated to stay inside except for essential out-
ings [24, 45, 50, 60]. Many in the US were under
similar restrictions, though some states issued state-
wide mandates after April 1, and other states did not
issue a stay-at-home order (and as of this writing in
early May, some states are lifting or planning to lift
restrictions) [37, 47, 52, 61].
To our knowledge — and our participants’ knowl-
edge — contact tracing apps were not available in
most of the countries from which we drew partici-
pants as of April 3. Only 9 of 200 participants indi-
cated that they had downloaded an app whose pur-
pose was studying or mitigating COVID-19, and ad-
ditionally 3 indicated that there was an app available
that they had not downloaded. All others said that
either an app was not available or they were not sure
if an app was available.
3.2 Contact tracing efforts
Here we give a brief overview of existing contact trac-
ing app efforts and the conversation around how to
contact trace in a privacy-preserving way, captured at
this point in time (early May). The purpose of this
section is to contextualize our findings and recom-
mendations, not give a comprehensive look at auto-
mated or technology-enabled contact tracing efforts.
Why automated contact tracing. Traditionally,
contact tracing is done by a team of public health ex-
perts and focuses on tracking down those who might
have been infected by someone who tested positive
for a disease, in combination with widespread test-
ing. There are multiple reasons that a state, re-
gion, or other entity might implement or endorse au-
tomated contact tracing (likely to augment or com-
plement human-based efforts) though not all experts
agree that automated contact tracing is needed or
will be effective. For example, as areas move toward
stopping “stay at home” orders, automated contact
tracing might be used to keep the rate of infection
low while allowing people to leave the home. Con-
tact tracing technologies might also be used to en-
force quarantine for people who have been identified
as COVID-19-positive.
Existing automated contact tracing programs
as of early May. Some governments have already
deployed contact tracing apps or programs, using a
variety of devices and data sources [5]. For example,
contact tracing apps exist in Bahrain, China, Colom-
bia, the Czech Republic, Ghana, India, Israel, the
Republic of North Macedonia, Norway, Singapore,
and some US States [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
15, 27, 39, 53]. Some apps are mandatory (e.g., in
China), and most are optional (e.g., Singapore) but
may struggle with low adoption [32]. Hong Kong
deploys electronic wristbands to those infected with
COVID-19 in order to ensure they were not leaving
their homes [59]. In South Korea, the government
sends text messages to everyone in a region with the
details of new COVID-19 cases, and there is a cen-
tral database available with anonymized information;
however, some entries in the database have been spe-
cific enough to be traced back to a single person, and
have started damaging rumors [16, 48]. Taiwan and
Israel both use cell tower data: Taiwan uses it for for
quarantine geofencing, while Israel uses it for contact
tracing (Israel’s data comes from a previously secret
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database used for counterterrorism) [39, 43]. There
may also be programs in other regions; this is not
meant to be an exhaustive list.
There is also significant interest in exploring auto-
mated contact tracing by other countries and regions,
and growing efforts by technology companies, star-
tups, governments, and universities to develop such
programs [25].
Additionally, several companies have leveraged ge-
olocation data to create “mobility reports” that mea-
sure the extent of social distancing in specific areas,
but do not identify or notify individual users [17, 18,
19, 20].
Design decisions affecting security and pri-
vacy. There are design properties at multiple levels
that affect user security and privacy, some of which
users may be inherently aware of (e.g., being poten-
tially identified as infectious in some designs), and
some of which are abstracted more from the user
(e.g., broadcast vs narrowcast; centralization vs de-
centralization). For a more complete and in-depth
discussion of these properties, see [56, 67].
Some groups explicitly focusing on privacy-
respecting contact tracing — each of which is making
design decisions based on their threat models and on-
the-ground situations — include Apple and Google,
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), the
University of Washington (UW), PEPP-PT, Inria,
and DP3T [21, 22, 26, 31, 66]. One high-level distinc-
tion that has gained more traction since our initial
surveys in early April is proximity tracking, in which
a user’s phone tracks other nearby phones, rather
than a more traditional implementation of contact
tracing, in which a user’s location is tracked.
Additionally, there are other, non-smartphone
methods that are being used and discussed for future
use in automated contact tracing, such as credit card
purchase history, and facial recognition on surveil-
lance camera footage [44, 62].
3.3 Broader issues and considera-
tions.
Beyond the privacy and security concerns and opin-
ions that our work surfaces, there are many other
broader issues that must be addressed before the
release of a contact tracing application. Our work
does not touch on these issues directly, but we would
be remiss not to mention some of the broader im-
pacts in a report about security and privacy. We
present example issues below, but refer readers to
[28, 38, 51, 54, 56, 63] for broader discussion of eq-
uity and efficacy concerns.
Availability for and usability by all. Govern-
ments and app makers must consider the implications
of an app being available only in certain languages,
or without accessibility features. If a certain demo-
graphic group is left without access, or without us-
able access, they may experience different rates of
infection. This lack of access may also lower the ef-
fectiveness of contact tracing.
Users without smartphones. Not all people
have smartphones, and some high risk groups, such
as seniors, may be less likely to regularly use a smart-
phone. A smartphone app disenfranchises those sets
of users.
Mandatory vs optional use. Some have raised
concerns about the efficacy of optional contact trac-
ing apps [63]; however, mandatory apps raise differ-
ent concerns about state surveillance, particularly if
mandatory for only a certain demographic. Opt-in
automated contact tracing efforts require the public
to reason about the privacy trade-offs. Mandatory
automated contact tracing efforts, meanwhile, could
force some to use technology that runs counter to
their privacy preferences (and potentially take pur-
posefully evasive actions to avoid tracking).
Explainability of contact tracing algorithm
and psychological effects. How should an app
notify a user that they may be infected, and how
much information should that app give about who
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infected them or when / where they were infected?
How should an app communicate the expected false
positive and false negative rate? If either false pos-
itives or false negatives are too high, users’ mental
health may suffer, or users may become overly confi-
dent that they are not infected.
Malicious actors. One or more intentionally false
reports of positive tests could have financial and so-
cial consequences for businesses or people who either
believe they are infected, or whom other people be-
lieve are infectious.
4 Related Work
Other groups have also investigated public opinion on
location tracking during COVID-19. Below we briefly
describe three efforts, and note that although not all
results match up exactly with respect to preferences
from different demographic groups, each survey asked
different questions, and on different dates.
Our results are also not exactly the same, but
all seem to indicate (a) reservations about govern-
ment location tracking from a significant portion of
the population and (b) over half of the population is
willing to download a contact tracing app under the
right circumstances. (However, we note that “the
right circumstances” may be different for different
user groups, and that there is more work needed
to determine how automated contact tracing might
affect marginalized or under-resourced groups, and
what needs those groups have with respect to con-
tact tracing, if any).
The Pew Research Center, in a survey conducted
April 7-12, reported that 60% of Americans do not
believe that location tracking by the government
would mitigate the pandemic, and many have con-
cerns about privacy or appropriateness of such track-
ing [29]. They found that there are statistically sig-
nificant differences between demographic groups de-
lineated by political party, race/ethnicity, and age,
with Republicans, Hispanic Americans, and those
who are 30 or older being more accepting of the gov-
ernment tracking location for the purposes of mitiga-
tion COVID-19.
Hargittai and Redmiles surveyed around a thou-
sand adults in the each of Italy, Switzerland, and the
US. They found that two thirds of the US partici-
pants would be willing to install a contact tracing
app, “that would help slow the spread of the virus
and reduce the lockdown period, even if that app
would collect information about their location data
and health status” [40, 41]. They found that those in
the US would most trust an app from a health agency
like the CDC or their insurance provider over the
other options they asked about, but that there is no
single trusted source. Therefore, in a Scientific Amer-
ican blog, they recommend multiple applications that
can interoperate, with a shared base technology, in
order to allow users to pick the app that best suits
their threat and usage model [41].
In a survey conducted April 21-26, a group from
The Washington Post and the University of Mary-
land found that 50% of American smartphone users
would not use an app using the contact tracing tech-
nology proposed by Apple and Google, and that a
further 18% of their respondents did not use a smart-
phone [23, 65]. The accompanying Washington Post
article notes that smartphone usage rate is lower
amongst seniors, who are more vulnerable to the dis-
ease. This survey found that Democrats would be
more willing to download the app, and that many
(57%) Americans would trust the CDC to deploy such
an app (consistent with Hargittai and Redmiles), but
that fewer (47%) would trust their health insurance
company.
Redmiles, in a separate survey conducted May 1-5,
found that around 80% of Americans would be willing
to download a contact tracing apps, depending on its
efficacy, accuracy, and privacy [55].
Our work adds to these results: though we have
fewer participants (and participants primarily from
Europe), we are able to answer more nuanced ques-
tions about data sources, privacy preferences, and we
also are able to distill some higher level user values
and concerns from qualitative data. Our study is
also longitudinal and positioned to observe changes
in opinions over time.
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5 Methodology
In order to collect rich data and measure public opin-
ion, we designed an approximately 15-minute online
survey with both multiple choice and free response
questions. Our survey was implemented in Qualtrics.
We deployed the survey through Prolific, an online
survey platform based in the United Kingdom.
Our institution’s IRB determined our study was
exempt from further human subjects review, and we
followed best practices for ethical human subjects
survey research, to the best of our knowledge, e.g.,
we paid at or slightly above minimum wage, all ques-
tions were optional except the initial questions about
age and smartphone usage, and we did not collect
unnecessary personal information. We did give par-
ticipants the option to submit their email address in a
separate Google form (not connected to their survey
results) in case they wanted to be contacted about
follow-up surveys.
5.1 Survey Protocol
Because we expected most participants to be from
countries where an app to track and mitigate COVID-
19 was not in ubiquitous use, at least at the time
of our initial survey, most of the survey was de-
signed to elicit user attitudes about contact tracing
in specific hypothetical situations, some more plausi-
ble than others (and some actually happening around
the world at the time of the survey). The survey
did include branches for those who had downloaded
an app for tracking or mitigating COVID-19, or who
had the opportunity to but chose not to; only a small
minority of the participants followed these branches.
In order to avoid biasing participants towards pre-
senting themselves as more privacy-conscious than
they are, the survey did not mention “privacy” un-
til the final two questions (demographics), and asked
instead about participants’ “comfort” with various
situations, or their “likelihood” of downloading an
app in a certain situation. Each section (except for
demographics) concluded with one or more optional
free-response questions, inviting participants to ex-
plain their answers.
The survey had the following main sections (ex-
cluding questions for participants who were already
using a contact tracing app).
Demographics. We asked participants three types
of demographic questions, centered around questions
about COVID-19, or variables we hypothesized might
correlate with their attitude towards COVID-19 and
contact tracing programs: (1) standard demographic
questions, like age, gender, geographic location; (2)
general political views, news sources, and privacy and
technology interest and knowledge (self-described);
(3) COVID-19-specific questions, like their general
level of concern about the pandemic, whether they
live with someone who is in a high-risk group, and
their beliefs and implementation about social distanc-
ing. We asked many of the demographic questions at
the end of the survey in order to help mitigate stereo-
type threat.
Cell tower location data. In this section, we
asked participants how comfortable they were with
their cell phone manufacturer or cellular carrier us-
ing their location data for the purposes of study-
ing or mitigating the spread of COVID-19. We pre-
sented participants with three variants on the situa-
tion: their location data being shared with their gov-
ernment, their location data being shared with their
government if they tested positive, and their location
data being shared publicly if they tested positive.
Existing apps using GPS location data. Next,
we asked participants to imagine that “the makers
of an existing app on your phone started using your
GPS location data to study or mitigate the spread of
COVID-19.” We chose 3 popular apps from each of 5
categories that we expected would use location data
(navigation, social media, messaging, transportation,
fitness) for a total of 15 apps. Participants rated their
comfort with each of the 15 apps using their location
data for mitigating the spread of COVID-19 on a 5-
point Likert scale, with an additional option for “I
don’t use this app.”
We then asked participants about their comfort
level if one of the apps they regularly use, which
might not be one of the ones in the list above, started
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using their location data to mitigate the spread of
COVID-19. Next, we asked two free-response ques-
tions about the app that they regularly use that they
would most trust and the app that they would least
trust to study or mitigate COVID-19.
New app: perfect privacy. We then asked par-
ticipants to imagine a new app that would track their
location at all times for the purposes of mitigating the
spread of COVID-19, but that it would protect their
data perfectly. We asked, on 5-point Likert scales,
how likely they would be to install the app, and how
it would change their current behavior.
New app: app makers know location at all
times but don’t share it. Changing the previous
scenario slightly, we asked participants to imagine a
new app that would know their location at all times
for the purposes of mitigating the spread of COVID-
19, and this time the app makers would know their
location at all time but would not share it. We again
asked participants how likely they would be to down-
load and use such an app. This time, we asked par-
ticipants to rate their comfort with each of companies
that made the same popular 15 apps we had shown
them previously making this app. We expanded this
list to include other companies in week 3 of the sur-
vey. We also asked about their comfort with five
generic entities making such an app: a university re-
search group, an activist group, an industry startup,
your government, and the United Nations.
New app: app makers know location at all
times and share with your government if you
are diagnosed with COVID-19. Changing the
previous scenarios again, we asked participants this
time about a situation in which the new app’s mak-
ers share their location history with the government
if they test positive for COVID-19. We asked, again,
how likely they would be to download such an app, as
well as their download likelihood in two variant situ-
ations: if the data were shared regardless of whether
they tested positive, and if the government’s use of
the data were supervised by judge.
Other location data sources: Surveillance
camera footage and credit card history. Turn-
ing away from location data collected by an app, and
in response to an evolving conversation about alter-
nate data sources, starting in week 3 we asked partic-
ipants next about their comfort with location history
derived from surveillance camera footage and credit
card purchase history.
New app: Proximity tracking. Due to the grow-
ing discussions about and technical work on prox-
imity tracking protocols and apps after April 1, in
week 3 we added a group of questions about prox-
imity tracking. We asked about proximity tracking
by phone manufacturers, phone operating systems,
a new app, and several well known companies or
generic entities.
Government use of location data. In this sec-
tion, we stepped back from scenarios about specific
data sources and asked participants questions about
a scenario in which their government acquires their
location data for studying and mitigating COVID-
19. We asked about their confidence in their govern-
ment’s deletion of the data after the pandemic, use
of data for only COVID-19 tracking, and their gen-
eral level of concern for their “personal safety or the
safety of those in their community.”
Desired features in a new COVID-19 mitiga-
tion app. We then asked participants about a wide
variety of roles that a potential new COVID-19 miti-
gation app might have in enforcing isolation or noti-
fying people of potential infections, drawn from exist-
ing contract tracing apps or programs. For example,
one feature we asked about was “notify you if you
came close to someone who later tested positive for
COVID-19” while another was “automatically notify
the authorities if people were not isolating as man-
dated.”
Location sharing with their government pre-
pandemic. Finally, we asked participants to rate
their level of comfort with their location data being
shared with their government in October 2019, i.e.,
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before COVID-19. Since participants may not ac-
curately recall their own previous beliefs, and may
have been primed towards privacy-sensitivity by the
rest of the survey, any results from this data must be
treated with caution.
5.2 Recruitment
We recruited participants through Prolific, an online
survey platform, with no demographic restrictions,
since Prolific already requires that all participants be
18 or older. The first two questions of our survey
screened participants as required by our IRB. We
asked: (1) are you at least 18 years old? and (2)
do you use a smartphone regularly?. If participants
answered ‘Yes’ to both, they proceeded to the rest of
the survey.
We ran the survey on Prolific on April 1, 3, 8, 10,
and every Friday thereafter, with 100 people each
time, around the same time (3pm Pacific). We ex-
clude participants who have taken any previous ver-
sion of the survey. On the initial release of the survey,
in early April, we also recruited participants using the
snowballing technique through our own contacts on
social media and over email. In this paper, we re-
port primarily on the Prolific participants recruited
on April 1 and 3, as well as cursory results of data
collected on May 1; in future papers, we plan to in-
clude the participants recruited more organically, as
well as deeper studies of the longitudinal data from
the weekly deployments on Prolific.
5.3 Analysis
In this initial report, we present raw percentages, no
statistical analysis. When presenting percentages, we
give the number of participants who answered that
question; although we recruited 100 participants for
each survey run,2 all questions were optional, and
a small minority already had an app that tracked
COVID-19 and thus did not take the main branch of
2In week 3, although we recruited 100 participants, we ac-
tually ended up with 102, due to two participants finishing af-
ter the time allotted by Prolific, the survey platform through
which we recruited
the survey (we do not report on this small minority
here).
6 Results
Here we report primarily on initial analysis of quan-
titative results from week 1 of our survey, with 100
Prolific participants on April 1 and April 3 each (200
total). For this initial report, our current analysis do
not include rigorous statistical analysis, but instead
report only on the percentages of users that give each
response to a question. We present these initial re-
sults — with caveats — because the issue is timely.
9 of the 200 participants from April 1 and 3 fol-
lowed a survey branch indicating they already had a
COVID-19 tracking app; we do not report on these 9
participants here.
Two notes on terminology: we use the term ‘con-
tact tracing’ as a superset of ‘location tracking’, and
‘proximity tracking’. When reporting qualitative re-
sults, we use the format W1P100 to mean participant
100 from week 1.
In the text below, our notation X[N ], where N is a
number, refers to unique identifiers in the Qualtrics
survey platform that we used. We use this notation
for internal bookkeeping and question disambigua-
tion as we continue to collect more data and revise
this report over time.
6.1 Participant Demographics
Participants resided primarily in the UK (26%),
the US (16%), 15 European countries (46.5%), and
7 other countries (11.5%). Our participants were
mostly young, with nearly half being less than 25
years old, and 56% male. Four participants identified
as agender or genderfluid, and one participant iden-
tified openly as transgender and male. We manually
bucketed gender identities as reported by participants
in a free response text field; we believe we have stayed
true to participants’ gender identities when bucket-
ing (e.g., by bucketing a ‘man’ response as ‘male’),
though we note that participants gender identities
may change over time, and that our participants may
have included more trans or gender non-conforming
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Figure 1: Participants’ general concern about
COVID-19 and the average time they spent away
from home per day in the last week.
participants than disclosed as so. To avoid the ef-
fect of stereotype threat, we asked most demographic
questions at the end of the survey.
6.1.1 Participants concerned about COVID-
19 and believe in social distancing
The majority of participants were concerned about
COVID-19 (79%, X6) and believed that social dis-
tancing is an important tool for slowing the spread
of COVID-19 (96.5%, X7). 80% reported leaving
their home less than one hour per day in the prior
week, with 28.5% not leaving their home at all (X8).
However, a distinct minority (19%) were unconcerned
(X6) and a quarter spent 6 or more hours per day out
of their home (though that is not necessarily at odds
with social distancing) (X8), as shown in Figure 1
37% of participants said they were either in a high
risk group or living with someone considered high risk
(X43).
Figure 2: Attitudes towards cell tower location data
being used for COVID-19 tracking. Columns sum to
1 and represent only the participants who answered
6.2 Mostly positive attitude toward
use of cell tower data for COVID-
19 mitigation so long as it is not
released publicly
Many participant were at least somewhat comfort-
able with their cell tower data being used for con-
tact tracing; from the situations we presented, par-
ticipants were most comfortable with their govern-
ment being given the data only if they tested pos-
itive, and much less comfortable with the data be-
ing released publicly, as shown in Figure 2. How-
ever, even amongst participants who were comfort-
able with their data being used (generically, as in
X12, or shared with the government, as in X13 and
X14), more were somewhat comfortable rather than
extremely comfortable, signifying their reservations.
Even in the situation that participants were most
comfortable — the data being shared with the gov-
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ernment if they tested positive — 13% were extremely
uncomfortable, and a further 15% were somewhat un-
comfortable.
Of the situations presented, participants were most
uncomfortable with the idea of their cell tower lo-
cation history being shared publicly if they tested
positive (61% uncomfortable) (X15). This situa-
tion is reminiscent of South Korea’s initial handling
of location tracking: location data and biographi-
cal details were posted publicly and were not suffi-
ciently anonymized, as groups discovered the iden-
tities of those who had tested positive and rumors
started about extramarital affairs and plastic surgery
trips [49]. South Korea has since started anonymizing
the publicly released data more thoroughly [62].
This sentiment of being uncomfortable with public
disclosure more generally underscores the importance
of location data being properly protected when and
if it is collected, to avoid data being made public or
being exposed to other parties through a data breach.
6.3 Amongst existing apps, partici-
pants are most comfortable with
an already-trusted mapping app
adding COVID-19 tracking
Figure 3 shows a heatmap of user comfort with each
of 15 apps hypothetically using their location data
to study or mitigate COVID-19, showing only re-
sponses for participants who reported actually using
the app. Participants were generally uncomfortable
with the idea of most apps using their location data
for COVID-19 tracking: 49% would be extremely un-
comfortable with TikTok adding this features; 30-
36% of participants would be extremely uncomfort-
able with any of the apps owned by Facebook that we
asked about (Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and
Messenger), and 21-28% somewhat uncomfortable for
the same apps.
Participants indicated the most comfort with
Google Maps or Apple Maps using their location data
to study or mitigate COVID-19 (among the 15 app
options given): 63% were at least somewhat com-
fortable with Google Maps, and 52% were at least
somewhat comfortable with Apple maps. This result
was collected before Apple and Google announced
their collaboration on a contact tracing app on April
10, but user comfort reported on weeks 2-5 remained
approximately the same (63-65% at least somewhat
comfortable with Google Maps; 49-54% at least some-
what comfortable with Apple Maps) [26].
We note that some of these apps have a smaller
sample size (e.g., TikTok, AllTrails), so that data
should be interpreted with more caution. Addition-
ally, there may be self-selection bias present in these
results: if an app has a more privacy-conscious user
base, its users may appear to be less comfortable with
it using location data for COVID-19 tracking, and it
may appear that that app is less trusted by all users.
Preliminary analysis of qualitative results from
week 1 in this section reveals common themes around
user values and concerns regarding what apps they
would trust most (X23) and least (X24) to use their
location data for the purposes of COVID-19 tracking.
In line with the quantitative results reported above,
most users picked Google Maps as their most trusted
app, and Facebook as their least trusted app, at least
in the context of using location data for COVID-19
tracking.
Participants’ reasons for picking their most trusted
app, or for not picking their least trusted app, include
(a) the general reputation or public image, (b) a good
history with privacy and security, (c) confidence in
the company having the resources to add COVID-
19 tracking to its services, and (d) location tracking
already being central to the app’s purpose.
Participants also mentioned several concerns,
which extend to any contact tracing program: (a)
stalking or personal harm due to poorly anonymized
data; (b) data leakage or privacy breaches; (c) data
being sold by the company; and (d) a “slippery slope”
in which this sort of tracking becomes the norm.
6.4 Privacy concerns reduce likeli-
hood to install a new COVID-19
tracking app, from 72% with per-
fect privacy
In response to three general data-sharing situations
that might be present with a new COVID-tracking
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Figure 3: Participant comfort with an existing app using their location to study or mitigate COVID-19
(numbers in columns add to 1 and are percentages; N = number of participants who use that app) (X18)
app, participants indicated that in the “best possi-
ble” privacy situation — “an app that protects your
data perfectly” — 72% would be at least somewhat
likely to download the app, as shown in Figure 4.
Estimates vary on how much of a population needs
to participate in contact tracing in order for it to
be effective and depend other interventions, but re-
cent work suggests a rate of around 60% [35, 36] to
70% [42].
If the app makers knew their location but did not
share with anyone, participants were less comfort-
able: only 19% would be extremely likely to down-
load this app, and 36% would be somewhat likely.
Further, 35% would be extremely or somewhat un-
likely to download the app.
Finally, participants were least comfortable with
app makers knowing their location and sharing it
with their government, though more were still likely
to download the app than unlikely: 49% were at least
somewhat likely, while 34% were somewhat or ex-
tremely unlikely.
These situations show that even in the best possi-
ble situation, with “an app that protects your data
perfectly,” most participants have reservations about
using an app to study or mitigate COVID-19. It
is worth noting that only about 20% of Singapore-
ans had downloaded Singapore’s contact tracing app,
TraceTogether, as of April 1 [30, 32, 35].
Further, 74.8% said that using such an app would
cause no change in their behavior, 20.9% said they
would be less social, and 4.2% reported that they
would be more social (X51). Being less social
12
Figure 4: Self-reported likelihood of downloading a
new app to study or mitigate COVID-19, given three
privacy situations: (X50) perfect privacy, (X55) app
makers know location, (X61) app makers know loca-
tion and share with the government if positive.
while being tracked by an app could indicate that
those 20.9% of participants would feel uncomfortably
surveilled when using the app or that they think the
app’s notifications might alter their behavior, while
the 4.2% who would be more social might feel pro-
tected by such an app.
Results from later surveys by others, and from our
later surveys, show similar willingness to download.
The Washington Post and University of Maryland
effort found that 50% of American smartphone own-
ers would definitely or probably use a contact trac-
ing app, while Hargittai and Redmiles found that
about two-thirds of Americans would download such
an app [40, 41, 65]. Separately, Redmiles found that
82% of Americans would be willing to download a
contact tracing app in perfect privacy and accuracy
conditions, but that their willingness to download
would drop dramatically if data could leak [55].
6.5 Participants care that app devel-
opers don’t share data; are most
comfortable with Google and the
UN developing a new app
Participant opinions about existing companies mak-
ing a new app followed similar trends as in Sec-
tion 6.3, shown in Figure 5: most participants were at
least somewhat comfortable with Google (61%), and
many were somewhat comfortable with Apple (33%;
10% extremely comfortable), though just as many
were uncomfortable with Apple (34% somewhat or
extremely uncomfortable). Participants were over-
whelmingly uncomfortable with the other companies
creating such an app.
Participants also indicated general mistrust for a
potential new COVID-19-tracking app created by an
industry startup (64% somewhat or extremely un-
comfortable) or an activist group (58% somewhat
or extremely uncomfortable), as show in Figure 6.
Responses indicate the most trust in a university-
developed app (74% somewhat or extremely com-
fortable), but we note that at the beginning of the
survey, participants were shown our university’s logo
and told that this survey was an academic endeav-
our, which may have caused responses bias, as found
by [34]. Participants were largely split on generic
trust for a government- or United Nations-developed
app.
Initial analysis of qualitative responses to X58 echo
the values and concerns reported in Section 6.3: par-
ticipants were concerned about sharing and selling
of their data, and lack of trust in multiple compa-
nies and activists and startups, with some perceived
to have ulterior motives. W1P198 explained: “if it
saves lives then i would use the app if it was made by
any company, i would be much happier if a university
did it as they have little to gain by having my data,
other than to use it for its intended reason.” Simi-
lar, W1P186 wrote: “I[t] leaves me uncomfortable as
I currently don’t trust many companies for data pro-
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Figure 5: Participant comfort level with companies hypothetically creating a new app to mitigate COVID-19,
assuming that app would know their location at all times, but would not share the data (X56).
tection, I could however be convinced if it were made
by a trusted university or worldwide organization.”
In contrast, Hargattai and Redmiles found that
universities would be one of the least trusted entities,
at less than 10%, while the survey by the Washing-
ton Post and the University of Maryland found they
were relatively trusted, at 57%. This discrepancy
highlights the need for multiple surveys and qualita-
tive data to better understand the nuances of public
opinion.
6.6 Unease over government use of
data
Stepping back from asking about a specific data
source, we asked participants about their confidence
in general in their government’s handling of any lo-
cation data marked for COVID-19 tracking.
Participants largely indicated a lack of trust that
their government would use its citizens’ location data
conservatively. 72% responded that they thought it
was somewhat or extremely unlikely that their gov-
ernment would delete the data (X66; N=190), and
65% said it was somewhat or extremely unlikely that
their government would use it only for the purposes
of tracking COVID-19 (X67; N=191). However, 26%
thought it was at least somewhat likely that their
government would use the data only for studying and
mitigating COVID-19 tracking.
Participants also indicated concern that such data
sharing or collection would be harmful to their safety
or the safety of those in their community (X68;
N=191) with 26% saying they were extremely con-
cerned, and 34% saying they were somewhat con-
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Figure 6: Participant comfort level with various
generic entities creating a new app to mitigate
COVID-19, assuming that app would know their lo-
cation at all times, but would not share the data
(X57).
Figure 7: Participants’ concern over government data
use “harming [their] personal safety or the safety of
those in [their] community”(X68).
cerned. 19% were somewhat unconcerned, and only
5% were extremely unconcerned, as shown in Fig-
ure 7.
6.7 Desired app features
Participants responded positively to four of the ten
potential app features we presented, shown in Fig-
ure 8: they desire contact tracing notifications (a, b)
and general studying of trends (h, j). They are fairly
evenly split on other features, even the more privacy-
violating features, like (d), in which the app would
make public a database of location history for anyone
who tested positive for COVID-19, and (g), in which
the app would automatically notify the authorities if
people were not isolating as mandated.
Interestingly, 49% of participants were at least
somewhat comfortable with feature (c), “make your
location history for the past two weeks publicly avail-
able if you tested positive for COVID-19,” whereas
in Section 6.2 X15 only 27% were at least somewhat
comfortable with cell tower data being made public
if they tested positive. The same difference occurs
in the May 1 data. This difference could be due to
users having different perceptions of control and au-
tonomy in the two scenarios, with users perceiving
(and perhaps having) more control over the behav-
iors of their apps versus the behaviors of the cellular
infrastructure.
6.8 Cursory analysis of later re-
sponses: similar trends; mixed
feelings about proximity track-
ing; negative towards other data
sources
Due to growing conversations about proximity track-
ing and alternate sources of location data, we added
sections to our survey in week 3. Here we present a
preliminary analysis of the data from weeks 3, 4, and
5, focusing on the most recent, week 5 (May 1).
In an initial (non-statistical) comparison with sur-
vey data from April 17, 23, and May 1 (weeks 3,
4, and 5 of our survey), many of the same general
opinions captured on April 1 and 3 appear. We also
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Figure 8: Features desired by participants in a COVID-19 tracking app (X72). Popular features bolded.
(a) Notify you if you came close to someone who later tested positive for COVID-19
(b) Notify anyone you came close to in the past two weeks if you tested positive for COVID-19
(c) Make your location history for the past two weeks publicly available if you tested positive for COVID-19
(d) Make public a database of the location histories of anyone who tested positive for COVID-19
(e) Notify you if your neighbors were not isolating themselves as recommended or mandated
(f) Let you notify the authorities if you saw people you suspected or knew to be breaking the isolation
recommended or mandated
(g) Automatically notify the authorities if people were not isolating as mandated
(h) Used by scientists to study trends, not individuals
(i) Geofence to enforce mandatory or voluntary quarantine
(j) General assessment of social distancing in an area to display areas of high congregation
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present preliminary results about opinions on prox-
imity tracking and the use of surveillance camera
footage and credit card data history as location data
sources, questions which were also added in week 3.
Geographic, gender, and age distribution for weeks
3, 4, and 5 were similar to week 1: participants were
primarily young, from the UK or Europe, and the
gender split was fairly even. In week 5 less than 10%
of participants were from the US (lower than other
weeks) and participants were 59% male.
Comparison with April 1 and 3 data. In com-
parison to Section 6.4, on May 1 approximately
the same percentage of participants said they would
download a new app to study or mitigate COVID-
19 “that protects your data perfectly” — 68% — but
fewer would be likely to download an app that shared
their location with their government (24% somewhat
or extremely likely), down from 51% on April 1 (Fig-
ure 4). April 17 and 23 show similar numbers to May
1, with fewer participants being likely to download a
location-tracking app that would share their location
with their government. We present these numbers
without analysis of statistical significance: this drop
could be due to randomness in our samples, or it
could indicate less willingness in later dates to down-
load an app if the data would be shared with the
government.
Participants’ opinions about cell tower data (Sec-
tion 6.2), trusted existing apps (Section 6.3), and
trusted companies and entities (Section 6.5) remained
similar to those from April 1 and 3, with participants
expressing comfort in companies and entities that
align with results from April 1 and 3: Universities,
Apple, Google, and Microsoft (Microsoft was added
as an option after our April 3 survey, and Google
and Apple’s announcement about creating a contact
tracing protocol occurred on April 10 [26]).
Proximity tracking. One new addition after the
initial April 1 and 3 survey (in week 3, on April 17)
was a section about proximity tracking, as the con-
versation about proximity tracking has continued to
grow amongst the privacy community and the public.
Because of the significant current public discussions
Figure 9: Participant self-reported likelihood of
downloading a proximity tracking situation on April
17, 23, and May 1.
about proximity tracking apps, we focus a sizeable
portion of our preliminary analysis on surfacing ex-
ample qualitative results, which we turn to after our
quantitative summaries.
In weeks 3-5, slightly less than half of the partici-
pants (46%-48%) were somewhat or extremely com-
fortable with their phone manufacturer or operating
system conducting proximity tracking (X121). In
weeks 3 and 4, participants were approximately as
comfortable with that same data being shared with
their government (50% both weeks); on week 5, 33%
of participants were somewhat or extremely comfort-
able with proximity data being shared with their gov-
ernment by their phone manufacturer or operating
system (X122). This drop may either represent less
confidence in government, or it may be due to ran-
domness in our data.
Participants’ self-reported likelihood of download-
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ing a proximity tracking app was approximately the
same as their likelihood of downloading a location-
tracking app in weeks 3 and 4 (X124; figures for
download likelihood for all situations and all 5 weeks
are available in Appendix B). In week 5, proximity
tracking received a more mixed response, as shown
in Figure 9. While the mixed response may be ei-
ther due to sample randomness (more participants
from week 5 were from Europe) or declining support
for proximity tracking, these results show that, as a
whole, the public would not strongly prefer a prox-
imity tracking app or protocol instead of a location
tracking app, at least at the time of the survey.
Initial analysis of qualitative data shows values and
concerns in line with those presented in Section 6.3:
participants reasoned about privacy, security, a “slip-
pery slope”, and data sharing. Some reasoned that
they would prefer proximity tracking, and others, lo-
cation tracking.
Several participants preferred proximity tracking
for security and privacy reasons. W5P42 mentioned
adversarial intentions: “I think proximity is better
than location as it does not track a persons where-
abouts, which I think can be manipulated more eas-
ily for nefarious things (e.g. stalking). Proximity
tracking seems more anonymous and safer in that as-
pect.” W3P4 reasoned that is more private and that
additionally it might be more accurate than location
tracking: “proximity tracking seems better from a pri-
vacy perspective. Perhaps even more accurate?” For
W4P25 and their community, proximity data is less
sensitive than location data: “It is better. My fam-
ily and friends are paranoid about the government
knowing their whereabouts at all or any given loca-
tion. This will give more peace to consumers.”
Some felt that both methods were too privacy in-
vasive. W5P72 wrote “They both seem shady to
me.”; W5P12 said “Not as intrusive but still terrify-
ing.” Others would be begrudgingly willing to install:
W3P54 said, “Again, I believe I could get used to it
if that is what this comes down to.” W3P45: “It is
for a good cause, but the idea of this kind of tracking
makes me uncomfortable.”
Others preferred location tracking. Their reason-
ing generally fell under the following themes:
• Direct and automatic communication between
phones is a security risk. W5P73: “Im hon-
estly more comfortable with location tracking
than my phone automatically exchanging infor-
mation with another phone.” W5P102: “Seems
possible for a safety breach between devices shar-
ing data.” W3P45: “This crosses the line a bit
I feel personally, I would want to know that this
information is secure and cannot be intercepted.”
• It will be less accurate than location tracking.
W5P87: “Location tracking would probably be
easier to get people on board for as it feels less in-
vasive, however, I think proximity tracking would
provide far more information and drastically in-
crease the efficiency of the whole process.”
• It is more privacy-invasive than location track-
ing. W5P88: “The government doesn’t have to
know with who I am.” W3P86: “It feels more of
an invasion of privacy, due to the subtleness of
it.”
• Physical security and spoofing. W3P27: “It
could be used for break-ins (checking if there is
someone home)”.
W5P83 commented the following, showing how the
accuracy for either location or proximity tracking
apps might be impacted be (perhaps unintentionally)
by evasive actions: “I believe an app like this is a fal-
lacious system as many people that I know of, at the
moment, avoid taking their smartphones outside of
the house unless strictly necessary.”
We are not here to comment on the accuracy of
participants’ mental models: our results reveal that
proximity tracking does not feel more private or se-
cure than location tracking to many potential users.
As shown in Section 6.3, many participants had sim-
ilar concerns about location tracking apps. There-
fore, developers of both location and proximity track-
ing apps must consider the various threat and men-
tal models of their potential users, and communicate
the threat model to which their protocol or app re-
sponses best. W4P41 directly addressed this issue: “I
am not quite comfortable with this tracking as I don’t
quite understand the mechanism behind such tracking
technology.”
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Figure 10: May 1 — Participant comfort level with
their location data being derived from credit card his-
tory or surveillance camera footage.
Another overarching theme from Section 6.3 is that
public image matters. Participants reasoned about
the app, company, or data source best suited to au-
tomated contact tracing on multiple occasions; while
the general public may or may not be able to reason
accurately about what entities, algorithms, or tech-
nical protocols are best suited for contact tracing, it
is still driving their decisions.
Other data sources: surveillance camera
footage and credit card history. Participants
were largely uncomfortable with their credit card his-
tory being used to derive their location (51% un-
comfortable when not shared with their government;
63% uncomfortable when shared with their govern-
ment), and were less comfortable with the idea of
their government deriving their location from surveil-
lance camera footage (69% uncomfortable), as shown
in Figure 10.
In comparison to cell tower data — another data
source that already exists and does not require a new
technology or application — participants were much
less comfortable with credit card history and surveil-
lance camera footage (compare to Figure 2; numbers
are similar for May 1 participants). W5P14 wrote,
“It’s totalitarian”, and W5P85 would “...find it too
similar to a police state situation.” However some
participants acknowledged that these data sources
may already exist: W5P63 wrote that “I’m already
being watched by surveillance camera footage when I
am outside so it would be just utilizing already present
stuff.”
7 Conclusion
Here we have presented preliminary results from sur-
veys about public opinion surrounding location pri-
vacy during the COVID-19 pandemic. We have been
conducting our surveys longitudinally, but report
here primarily on our April 1 and 3, 2020 survey re-
sults. We have also sampled findings from later runs
of the survey. As we have stated throughout the re-
port: these results are preliminary, presented without
statistical analysis, and without peer review.
The report adds to other concurrent work about
public opinion on potential contact tracing technolo-
gies and privacy concerns, and we strongly encourage
contact tracing developers, policy makers, and oth-
ers to consider the user values and concerns presented
here, as user cooperation is crucial.
We plan to update this report with more in-
depth analysis and longitudinal data over time.
Updates will be published at https://seclab.cs.
washington.edu/research/covid19/.
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A Survey Protocol
The survey protocol is below. We give section head-
ings and descriptors for the reader’s reference here;
participants did not see headers. Unless otherwise
specified, all questions were answered on a five-point
Likert scale.
The logo of our institution (with the institution
name prominent) appear as a header to each survey
page. Our lab and department name did not.
On April 10 (week 2), we fixed typos, and added
‘tax agency’ as an option for the government sectors.
On April 17 (week 3) we made the following
changes to the survey:
• fixed typos;
• standardized the use of italics and bold text;
• added ‘Microsoft’ as an option in Section A.7;
• added a group of questions about other location
data sources (Section A.9);
• added a group of questions about proximity trac-
ing (Section A.10).
A.1 Consent and Screening
This is a survey about location tracking and
Coronavirus (COVID-19) by researchers at the
University of Washington, in Seattle, Washington,
USA. The University of Washingtons Human Sub-
jects Division reviewed our study, and determined
that it was exempt from federal human subjects reg-
ulation. We do not expect that this survey will put
you at any risk for harm, and you dont have to an-
swer any question that makes you uncomfortable. In
order to participate, you must be at least 18 years
old, regularly use a smartphone, and able to com-
plete the survey in English. We expect this survey
will take about 15-20 minutes to complete.
If you have any questions about this survey, you
may email us at [study-specific-email].
Thanks for taking our survey! To start, please an-
swer the two questions below...
Are you at least 18 years old? [yes, no]
Do you use a smartphone regularly? [yes, no]
A.2 Demographics I
This survey involves questions about COVID-
19, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 (commonly
known as coronavirus).
X6: How concerned are you about COVID-19?
X7: Do you believe that social distancing is an
important tool for slowing the spread of COVID-19?
[yes, no]
X8: Averaged over the past week, approximately
how many hours much time per day did you spend
out of your home, within 6 feet (2 meters) of other
people? (e.g., getting groceries, working at an essen-
tial job like in a hospital, in a grocery store, etc). [‘I
did not leave my home’, 0-1 hours per day, 2-3 hours
per day, ... , 7-8 hours per day, 8+ hours per day]
X9: In which country do you currently reside?
[drop-down country list]
X10: For respondents in the USA: in which state
do you currently reside? [drop-down US state list]
A.3 Cell phone manufacturer and
provider location data
Cell phone manufacturers and cellular providers have
access to your physical-world location.
X12: How comfortable are you with your cell phone
manufacturer or your cellular carrier using your loca-
tion data for the purposes of studying or mitigating
the spread of COVID-19?
X13: How comfortable are you with your cell phone
manufacturer or your cellular carrier sharing your lo-
cation data for the past two weeks with your gov-
ernment for the purposes of studying or mitigating
the spread of COVID-19? (Regardless of whether
you test positive for COVID-19.)
X14: If you tested positive for COVID-19,
how comfortable would you be with your cell phone
manufacturer or your cellular carrier sharing your lo-
cation data for the past two weeks with your gov-
ernment for the purposes of studying or mitigating
the spread of COVID-19?
X15: If you tested positive for COVID-19,
how comfortable would you be with your cell phone
manufacturer or your cellular carrier sharing your lo-
cation data for the past two weeks publicly?
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X16: Optionally, do you have any other thoughts
about your cell phone manufacturer or your cellular
carrier sharing your location data for the purposes
of studying or mitigating the spread of COVID-19?
[free response]
A.4 Existing app location data
Some phone applications have access to your physical-
world location, either when the application is in use
or all the time. Suppose the makers of an exist-
ing app on your phone started using your GPS
location data to study or mitigate the spread
of COVID-19. For example, this could include dis-
closing past locations of known positive COVID-19
cases to the public or to the government, or alerting
people who have crossed paths with the positive case.
X18- Below we’ve listed 15 commonly-used apps.
For the apps that you use regularly: how comfortable
are you with the following apps using your location
data for the purposes of studying or mitigating the
spread of COVID-19? [“I dont use this app” + 5-
point Likert scale for each of the following apps]
• Google Maps
• Apple Maps
• Waze
• Facebook
• Instagram
• TikTok
• WhatsApp
• Facebook Messenger
• Zoom
• Uber
• Lyft
• Airbnb
• Calorie Counter (MyFitnessPal)
• FitBit
• AllTrails
Suppose that one of the apps that you regularly use
– not necessarily one of the ones above – started using
your location data to study or mitigate the spread of
COVID-19.
X20: How comfortable are you with this app using
your location data for the purposes of studying or
mitigating the spread of COVID-19?
X22: If you tested positive for COVID-19,
how comfortable would you be with this app sharing
your location data for the past two weeks publicly?
X23: Consider all the apps you regularly use on
your phone (not just the apps listed earlier). Which
app would you most trust to use your location data
for the purposes of studying and mitigating COVID-
19? Why? [free response]
X24: Which app that you currently use would you
least trust to use your location data for the purposes
of studying and mitigating COVID-19? Why? [free
response]
A.5 Current use of COVID-19 app
X25: Have you used any apps that help track the
spread of COVID-19? (i.e. Singapore’s “TraceTo-
gether”) [yes, no]
If yes, participants branch to ‘already have app.’
If no, participants continue.
A.6 New app, perfect privacy
Imagine there is a new app that would track your
location at all times for the purposes of mitigating
the spread of COVID-19.
Suppose that this app protects your data perfectly.
X50: How likely would you be to install and use
this app?
X51: Would this app change your current behav-
ior?
X52: Optionally, please use this space tell us any
initial thoughts you have about such an app. [free
response]
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A.7 New app, app makers know loca-
tion
Imagine there is a new app that would track your lo-
cation at all times for the purposes of studying or
mitigating the spread of COVID-19.
Suppose now that the makers of the application
would know your location at all times, but would not
share your location with any other entity.
X55: How likely would you be to install and use
this app?
X56: Now, suppose that the app is made by one
of the following companies, all of which already have
created popular apps. Please rate how comfortable
you would be if each company were responsible for
this new app. [“I don’t know enough about this com-
pany to make a decision” + 5-pt Likert scale for each
of the following]
• Google (Google Maps, Waze, etc)
• Apple (Apple Maps)
• Facebook (Facebook, Facebook Messenger, In-
stagram, WhatsApp)
• Microsoft (Skype, OneDrive, etc)3
• ByteDance (TikTok)
• Zoom Video Communication
• Uber
• Lyft
• AirBnb
• MyFitnessPal
• AllTrails
• FitBit
X57: Suppose that the app is made by one of the
following general entities. Please rate how comfort-
able you would be if one of the following were respon-
sible for this new app, which would use the location
data they collect from your smartphone to track the
spread of COVID-19. [5-pt Likert scale for each of
the following]
3Added April 17 (week 3).
• A university research group
• An activist group
• An industry startup
• Your government
• The United nations
X58: Optionally, please use the space below to
elaborate on your thoughts about one or more com-
panies using your location data for the purposes of
tracking COVID-19. [free response]
A.8 New app, app makers share data
with government
Again, imagine there is a new app that would track
your location at all times for the purposes of studying
or mitigating the spread of COVID-19.
Suppose now that the makers of the application
would know your location at all times, and would also
share that data with your government if you were di-
agnosed with COVID-19.
X61: How likely would you be to install and use
this app?
X62: If the governments use of the data were su-
pervised by a judge, how likely would you be to
install and use this app?4
Now suppose that the makers of the application
would share your location data with your government
only if you tested positive for COVID-19.
X112: How likely would you be to install and use
this app?
X64: Optionally, do you have any other thoughts
about a company that is doing COVID-19 tracking
sharing your location with your government? [free
response]
X115: Optionally, do you have any other thoughts
about judicial oversight of the governments usage of
location data? [free response]
4This question, and the rest of this section, was added on
April 17 (week 3) as a previous version was ambiguous.
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A.9 Other location data sources:
Credit card history and surveil-
lance camera footage
There are other ways to track someone’s location.
One is the use of video cameras in public places. An-
other is the use of credit card purchasing histories.5
X115: How comfortable would you be with your
credit card company deriving your location his-
tory for the past two weeks for the purposes of study-
ing and mitigating the spread of COVID-19?
X116: How comfortable would you be with your
credit card company deriving your location his-
tory for the past two weeks and sharing it with
your government for the purposes of studying and
mitigating the spread of COVID-19?
X117: Optionally, do you have any other thoughts
about your location history being derived from your
credit card purchase history?
A.10 Proximity tracing
One alternative to location tracking for the purposes
of studying or mitigating COVID-19 is proximity
tracing, in which your phone would automatically
exchange information with every phone within 6 feet
(2 meters) of your phone, keeping track of your
close physical encounters, but not tracking
your actual location. This data could then be used
to reconstruct your close encounters if you contracted
COVID-19, or could alert you if someone you had
been in close physical proximity to tested positive for
COVID-19.6
X121: Imagine that your cell phone manufac-
turer or phone operating system would conduct
proximity tracing for the purposes of studying or mit-
igating COVID-19 (and, vice versa, other phones will
record that they have been in the proximity of your
phone). How comfortable would you be with this?
X122: Suppose that your cell phone manufac-
turer or phone operating system would share
this proximity data with your government if you
tested positive for COVID-19. How comfortable
would you be with this?
5This section added April 17 (week 3)
6This section added April 17 (week 3)
X123: Optionally, do you have any other thoughts
about your cell phone manufacturer or phone oper-
ating system tracking other phones nearby? [free re-
sponse]
Imagine instead there is a new app that would con-
duct proximity tracing for the purposes of studying
or mitigating COVID-19: that is, it would not track
your location, but would instead keep track of other
phones that you are nearby (and, vice versa, other
phones with this app will record that they have been
in the proximity of your phone).
X124: How likely would you be to download this
app?
X125: Now, suppose that the proximity tracing
app is made by one of the following companies.
Please rate how comfortable you would be if each
company were responsible for this new app. [“I don’t
know enough about this company to make a decision”
+ 5-pt Likert scale for each of the following]
• Google (Google Maps, Waze, etc)
• Apple (Apple Maps)
• Facebook (Facebook, Facebook Messenger, In-
stagram, WhatsApp)
• Microsoft (Skype, etc)
• ByteDance (TikTok)
• Zoom Video Communication
• Uber
• Lyft
• AirBnb
• MyFitnessPal
• AllTrails
• FitBit
X126: Now, suppose that the proximity tracing
app is made by one of the following general entities.
Please rate how comfortable you would be if each
entity were responsible for this new app.
• A university research group
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• An activist group
• An industry startup
• Your government
• The United nations
X127: Optionally, do you have any other thoughts
about an app that tracks other phones nearby?
X128: Optionally, do you have any other thoughts
about proximity tracking versus location tracking for
the purposes of studying or mitigating COVID-19?
A.11 Government use of data
If the government acquired your location data
or proximity data7(i.e. from an app on your
phone, from your cell phone carrier, etc) for the
purposes for studying and mitigating COVID-
19....
X66: How likely do you think it is that your gov-
ernment would delete the data after the pandemic
ends?
X67: How likely do you think it is that your gov-
ernment would only use the data for the purposes of
tracking COVID-19?
X68: How concerned would you be about your gov-
ernments use of your location data harming your
personal safety or the safety of those in your com-
munity?
X69: Suppose your location was shared with only
a specific sector of the government. For each of the
following sectors of government, please rate how com-
fortable you would be with them having access to
your location data.
• Federal Disease Tracking Agency (US: CDC)
• Your state or City Health Department
• Tax Agency (US: IRS)
• Local law enforcement (state, country, city, etc)
• Immigration authorities (US: CBP or ICE)
7’or proximity data’ added April 17
X70: Optionally, please use the space below to
elaborate on your thoughts about the government
having access to your location data for the purposes
of COVID-19 tracking. [free response]
A.12 App features
In some countries, such as South Korea, China, and
Singapore, there do exist apps to monitor the spread
of COVID-19 through location tracking. These apps
can have multiple purposes, including:
- Alerting the user if they have come into contact
with someone who later tests positive with COVID-
19;
- Helping the community or law enforcement en-
force isolation and quarantine edicts;
- Tracing viral strains through the community.
X72: If a new app were deployed in your country
to mitigate the spread of COVID-19, which of the
following features would you want it to have? (5-
point Likert-scale for each of the following:)
• Notify you if you came close to someone who
later tested positive for COVID-19
• Notify anyone you came close to in the past two
weeks if you tested positive for COVID-19
• Make your location history for the past two
weeks publicly available if you tested positive for
COVID-19
• Make public a database of the location histories
of anyone who tested positive for COVID-19
• Notify you if your neighbors were not isolating
themselves as recommended or mandated
• Let you notify the authorities if you saw people
you suspected or knew to be breaking the isola-
tion recommended or mandated
• Automatically notify the authorities if people
were not isolating as mandated
• Used by scientists to study tends, not individuals
• Geofence to enforce mandatory or voluntary
quarantine
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• General assessment of social distancing in an
area to display areas of high congregation
X73: Optionally, do you have any other thoughts
about what you would want such an app to do? [free
response]
X74: Optionally, do you have any other thoughts
about what you would want such an app to NOT do?
[free response]
X75: Is such an app available in your
country? [Yes / No / Im not sure]
If yes, participants branch to App available
A.13 Section 5.0: Prior privacy pref-
erences
Were now going to ask you about your thoughts
about location sharing with your government BE-
FORE COVID-19.
80 - In Oct 2019 (before the first known cases of
COVID-19), how comfortable would you have been
with your location data being shared with the gov-
ernment in general?
81 - In Oct 2019 (before the first known cases of
COVID-19), how comfortable were you with your lo-
cation data being shared with the following sectors
of government? [5-Point Likert scale for each of the
following:]
• Federal Disease Tracking Agency (US: CDC)
• Your state or City Health Department
• Tax Agency (US: IRS)
• Local law enforcement (state, country, city, etc)
• Immigration authorities (US: CBP or ICE)
82 - Optionally, please use the space below to elab-
orate on your thoughts about one or more companies
sharing your location data with some part of the gov-
ernment (before COVID-19). [free response]
A.14 Demographics II
Almost done!
X39: What is your age? (you may answer approxi-
mately if you do not know, or wish not to say exactly)
[free response]
X40: What is your gender identity? [free response]
X41: What political party do your views typically
align with? [free response]
X42: What are your top three news sources? (i.e.
Twitter, Facebook, Fox News, CNN, NPR, New York
Times, etc) [free response]
X43: Regarding COVID-19, are you in high risk
group or live with someone with high risk? [yes / no]
X44: Are you generally interested in or concerned
about privacy and technology? [yes / no]
X45: Do you know how to change location permis-
sions for apps on your phone? [yes / no]
A.15 Branch: app is available
X76: Have you downloaded the app in your country
to mitigate or study the spread of COVID-19? [yes,
no]
X77: If you have not downloaded the app: why
not? what changes, or assurances by the manufac-
turer or government (if any) would you want to see
to the app before downloading? [free response]
X78: What are your thoughts about the privacy
properties of this app? [free response]
A.16 Branch: Already have app
You indicated that there is an app (or apps) available
in your country to track, study, or mitigate COVID-
19. This section will ask about that app.
X27: What is the name of the app, or apps?
X28: Why did you install and use it?
X29: Do you know anyone who did not download
the app? [yes, no]
X30: If so, why did they not install it?
X31: What concerns, if any, do you have about the
app?
X32: If you had or have concerns, what outweighed
the concerns and lead you to the decision to download
the app?
X33: What concerns, if any, do you have about
your government having access to your location data?
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X34: What concerns, if any, do you have about the
app makers having access to your location data?
X35: Do you expect the app makers to stop storing
your location data after the pandemic is over?
X36: Do you plan to delete the app after the pan-
demic?
X37: Anything else youd like to say about the app
and/or your concerns?
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B Participants’ Download
Likelihood of Contact Trac-
ing Apps: Weeks 1-5
This appendix shows the download likelihood data in
each situation for Weeks 1-5.
Week 1:
Week 2:
Week 3:
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Week 4:
Week 5:
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